



Sources for series: 'The Unseen Currents: The Long-Term Consequences of ITQs'

Source Title	Brief
<p>Gordon, H.S. (1954). The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i>, 62(2).</p>	<p>The foundational academic paper that defined the "Tragedy of the Commons" in fisheries, providing the primary intellectual justification for introducing Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) as a solution to prevent economic and biological overexploitation.</p>
<p>Pascoe, S., Hoshino, E., & Williams, S. (2022). Conflicting perceptions of quota-based systems in Australian fisheries. <i>Marine Policy</i>, 137.</p>	<p>Provides detailed context on Australia's early adoption of ITQs (e.g., Southern Bluefin Tuna in 1984) and the dual aims of sustainability and economic efficiency that drove their introduction.</p>
<p>Ludwig von Mises Institute. (1929/2006). <i>A Critique of Interventionism</i>.</p>	<p>Supports the philosophical backdrop of the series by detailing the Austrian School's argument that government intervention (like creating a quota system) inevitably leads to unintended, self-defeating consequences, setting the stage for Chapter 10's theoretical framework.</p>
<p>Pascoe, S., Hoshino, E., & Williams, S. (2022). Conflicting perceptions of quota-based systems in Australian fisheries. <i>Marine Policy</i>, 137.</p>	<p>Highlights investor ownership and leasing as a primary social concern flagged by fishers, noting that "ownership of quota by non-fishers (i.e. investors)" is a major problem with the current system.</p>
<p>Parliament of Australia Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee. (2022). Report: Fisheries Quota Systems (Submission Analysis).</p>	<p>Summarises submissions detailing how the transferability of quota has separated the right to fish from the activity of fishing, enriching quota holders who do not go to sea and creating a class of "lease-dependent fishers."</p>

<p>Australian Government. (2023). Australian Government response to the Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee report: Fisheries quota system.</p>	<p>Addresses the issue of generational access by recommending the government explore ways to make publicly owned quota available for small, lease, and First Nations fishers, implicitly confirming the high barrier to entry created by current quota prices.</p>
<p>STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE ITQ MANAGED FISHERIES (Submission to the 2022 Senate Inquiry).</p>	<p>Provides detailed examples and strategies (e.g., controlling regional quota transfers and requiring quota owners to be aboard) aimed at mitigating the consolidation of quota and maintaining access for small, owner-operator vessels.</p>
<p>van Putten, I., & Gardner, C. (2010). Concentration of Ownership and Control in Fisheries. CSIRO Publishing.</p>	<p>Review of international ITQ programs showing that quota systems lead to the consolidation of fishing power and ownership over time, resulting in fewer, larger companies and increased vertical integration across harvesting, processing, and marketing.</p>
<p>Parliament of Australia Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee. (2022). Report: Fisheries Quota Systems.</p>	<p>Outlines the Inquiry's terms of reference which specifically asked whether the current system "disempowers small fishers and benefits large interest groups," reflecting public and political concern over monopolistic tendencies.</p>
<p>McCay, B. (1995). Social and Cultural Implications of ITQs. Ocean & Coastal Management, 28(2-3).</p>	<p>A critical, international review highlighting how the drive for economic "efficiency" under ITQs can lead to the erosion of social norms, loss of community identity, and increased inequality in fishing regions.</p>
<p>Pascoe, S., Hoshino, E., & Williams, S. (2022). Conflicting perceptions of quota-based systems in Australian fisheries. Marine Policy, 137.</p>	<p>Documents the overwhelmingly negative perceptions of ITQs reported by individual fishers in Australia, particularly concerning negative social outcomes for local communities compared to the positive views held by industry associations.</p>

<p>Ruppert, E. et al. (2017). Species diversity, abundance, biomass, size and trophic structure of fish on coral reefs in relation to shark abundance. Marine Ecology Progress Series.</p>	<p>Provides strong observational evidence of trophic cascades in marine ecosystems, where the removal of apex predators (sharks) due to fishing pressure alters the abundance and behaviour of lower-level predators and herbivores, consistent with the concept of "mesopredator release" as an ecological irony of management.</p>
<p>Oceanographic Magazine. (2025). Shark fishing a thorny issue for coral reef health, new study reveals. (Citing University of WA / AIMS research).</p>	<p>Summarises findings linking reduced shark numbers to changes in feeding behaviour of smaller predatory fish, showing that conservation efforts focused solely on target species can lead to unintended ecosystem imbalances.</p>
<p>NSW Department of Primary Industries (DPI). (Ongoing). NSW Mulloway Harvest Strategy Review and Recommendations.</p>	<p>Government management document detailing the ongoing process of management reform for Mulloway, explicitly examining the introduction of tighter controls, including potential quota or effort shares, confirming that these species are active frontiers for ITQ-style management.</p>
<p>NSW Department of Primary Industries (DPI). (Ongoing). NSW Snapper Harvest Strategy Review and Recommendations.</p>	<p>Confirms that Snapper is subject to a formal process for defining a harvest strategy, often leading to decisions about transitioning toward management systems (like ITQs or effort quotas) to cap catch and reduce economic pressure.</p>
<p>Boyce, J.R. (2009). The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Fisheries. Ecological Economics, 68(11).</p>	<p>Academic analysis of how the introduction of ITQs generates economic rents (unearned profits) and the corresponding effort by firms and governments to capture these rents, explaining how the economic value of the fishery is transferred away from the working fishers and into the hands of quota owners.</p>

<p>STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE ITQ MANAGED FISHERIES (Submission to the 2022 Senate Inquiry).</p>	<p>Argues that Australian ITQ management is "unusual in the privatisation of economic yield" and proposes strategies to capture the economic rent generated by public resources and redirect it back to the community.</p>
<p>Ludwig von Mises. (1949). Human Action: A Treatise on Economics.</p>	<p>Provides the philosophical foundation for the final chapter, arguing that human action is driven by purposeful choice and that interventions (like administered allocation via quotas) distort the necessary price signals and calculation required for rational economic activity, undermining the organic, adaptive order of the market.</p>
<p>Ludwig von Mises Institute. (1929/2006). A Critique of Interventionism.</p>	<p>Mises's central argument that interventions intended to fix market problems inevitably create new, worse problems, leading to a demand for further intervention—a feedback loop that mirrors the policy churn described in the chapter's thematic snippet.</p>
<p>Matulich, S.C., & Sever, M. (1999). Quota Unification and Rationalization in the Pacific Halibut Fishery. <i>Marine Resource Economics</i>, 14(2).</p>	<p>An applied economic study showing that the initial allocation of ITQs is a political decision rather than a rational economic one, providing a counterpoint to the laissez-faire ideal Mises promoted and illustrating the inherent problems of administering a market.</p>